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Executive Summary
Currently the signs of slow growth and recession are every where; an economic slowdown in China and 
Japan, a slowdown in Germany,  the U.K. and other Northern European countries; recession in Southern 
European countries with extremely high levels of unemployment and slow economic growth in the U.S. Fast 
growing government debt levels. Fiscal austerity, banks in trouble, shops and businesses closing down. The  
economic picture is gloomy around the world. This gloom has more or less continued from the onset of the 
crisis in 2008.
The 2008 crisis was different from previous crises. It did not start with consumers tightening their belts due 
to a higher price of commodities, either agriculture produce or natural resources. It did not start with general  
inflation levels outstripping increases in income levels. There were no supply problems back in 2008. It also 
did not start with governments raising taxes and reducing expenditure levels and finally companies did not 
stop investing all of a sudden. World exports and imports were up rather than down in 2008 (in volume by 
3.1%, according to the OECD Economic Outlook figures). The 2008 crisis did not start as an economic  
crisis, a crisis caused by factors negatively effecting wages or salaries (incomes) or expenditure levels. The 
2008 crisis was not an economic growth crisis.
The crisis did start from the assets and liabilities side. It was and is a world balance sheet crisis. Balance  
sheet crises can be caused by assets reducing in values and/or liabilities not being serviced out of incomes.  
The balance sheet crisis started in the U.S. with banks and mortgage providers selling mortgages to people  
who could not afford the mortgage repayments out of their incomes. The total subprime market segment was  
“only” $1.2 trillion out of the total mortgage market of $10 trillion. In the U.S in the period 2007 till 2011  
the total  number  of  bank repossessions of homes was 4.4 million out  of  a total  of  78.6 million owner  
occupied  homes.  Over  this  five  year  period  5.5% of  all  owner  occupied  homes  were  repossessed  and 
offloaded into the housing market. It was this bankers’ action which moved the goalposts from an income  
related issue for 4.4 million American households to an asset value issue for all 78.6 million home owning  
households. Over the period 2007-2011 the U.S Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations 
as published by the Federal Reserve showed a loss to households -a drop in equity, in savings- in home 
values of US$6.6 trillion, representing a loss of 28.9% as compared to end of 2006 values. Every American  
homeowner lost on average $84,000 out of the original $ 289,000 value in 2006, over the period till the end 
of 2011. Just to put it in perspective: this loss was practically equal to all U.S Federal Government combined 
revenues of 2009, 2010 plus 2011, which added up to $6.78 trillion.  
What a balance sheet can show and what a GDP growth rate does not show, is the reward for savings. The  
securitisation of U.S home loans and the doubtful debtor performance of 5.5% of all owners over the last five 
years  did not  allow for  a  gradual  work out  program.  Investors  wanted their  money back as  they were 
promised a “safe” AAA rated asset and this promise was broken. Investment banks should have paid the 
price for broken promises but they did not. So the adjustments were made by selling off homes. This action  
caused substantial losses to the savings levels incorporated in the homes of all U.S home owners; a 28.9% 
loss since 2007 to be precise.  Collectively individual  households adjusted their  spending and borrowing 
behaviour by paying off home loans and borrowing less for homes. The negative effect on GDP was -6.9% 
per annum for the last five years. Such behaviour influenced demand levels and government tax revenues as  
well as the returns on pension savings.
The negative returns on savings in homes, on company shares and other equity, on government bonds -the 
latter in returns below inflation level- and the losses in pension funds returns all do not show up in GDP  
figures. They are however the key economic issue and they do show up in the Balance Sheet of Individual  
Households. These savings losses draw attention to some flaws in the U.S. economic set up -the econsystem 
flaws- which have greatly contributed to the length and depth of this period of recession and slow economic 
growth. Some system changes will be suggested for the U.S. and a final section will be devoted to drawing a 
few parallels with some European economic actions.
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1. The Balance Sheet Crisis
1.1 Introduction
It may be as basic as setting out what individual households own and what they owe - the balance sheet-
which makes the difference in understanding to what happens in an economy. The United States1 and the 
United Kingdom collect  such data;  Eurostat,  the European Union statistical  agency has  the  intention to  
publish such data, but not until 2020. In this study the main focus of attention will be on the United States for  
several  reasons.  The first  reason is  that  if  it  would be possible  to find solutions  for the  U.S economic  
problems -a country which has the largest GDP and wealth of any country in the world- than other countries  
would benefit from the positive side effects. The second reason is that the policy solutions which the U.S.  
government may choose and implement may well help other governments to decide which of these policies 
are appropriate for their own countries. 
In the U.S. the net asset base of the collective of individual households -its net savings level or net worth- 
reached $62.7 trillion as per the end of the second quarter of 2012. Compare this to the revenue level of the 
U.S government over fiscal year 2011 of $2.4 trillion and it might be obvious that government actions need  
to  focus  on  creating  and  maintaining  the  economic  environment  -the  economic  infrastructure  or 
“econsystem”-  for the private sector to create further wealth.  Such wealth creation is  for the benefit  of  
individual  households -self  interest- but  also simultaneously for government functions which the private 
sector cannot easily execute, like healthcare, defence and social support for the unemployed and other groups 
which have no way to earn a living.
The main focus of this paper is to analyse what has happened to the returns over the accumulated savings  
elements of the U.S individual households over the last five year period: the returns over savings invested in 
homes, in equities, in government bonds and in mutual funds and pension funds. Elements of the economic 
infrastructure like the banking sector, the mortgage lending process, the possible adjustment process if things 
go wrong and the timing of government action over its own balance sheet and profit and loss accounts will 
be discussed.
What has changed over time in the U.S. and elsewhere is that the economic emphasis has shifted from what 
people earn in a year and how much output they produce to what happens to their accumulated savings build 
up over many years. Returns over savings are not just expressed in terms of dividends and interest -the  
income side which shows up in GDP figures- but also in asset values- the balance sheet side of society.  
Measuring GDP is not unimportant but it only reflects how well savings are being used in a society.
1.2 How it all started
Generally speaking, when banks get involved with the funding of home loans, their risk taking is based on  
predicting individual income levels and - as a fall back position- on the expected future home values. If one  
studies the trends in  the  U.S.  home markets  it  should be clear  in  hindsight  that  the stress in  the home  
mortgage markets started in 2006 already.
In the U.S. during the few years preceding 2008, mortgage originators started to have mortgages approved by 
banks on basis of doubtful principles. A Deutsche Bank study2 came to the conclusion that 37% of the sub-
prime  mortgages  granted  were  interest  only  mortgages;  38% of  the  mortgages  also  required  no  down 
payment  so 100% of the value of the home was borrowed; 43% of the borrowers were not required to 
provide any proof of income and finally 80% of borrowers were attracted by providing them with a low start  
up interest rate for a period of two years, after which interest rates were hiked steeply.
1 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pdf
2 http://www.globalsecuritisation.com/08_gbp/gbp_gssf08_022_031_db_us_subprm.pdf
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According to the study, the subprime market segment “only” amounted to U.S$1.2 trillion out of the total 
home mortgage market of U.S$10 trillion in 2008.
U.S. investment banks started to package these subprime mortgages into Collateralised Debt Obligations.  
Based on AAA ratings from the U.S. credit rating agencies, the investment banks sold these CDO’s around 
the world, but also to U.S. money market funds. When the real risks to these mortgages appeared, as cash  
flows faltered, the U.S investment banks broke their promises and were in no position to maintain a market  
in  these  CDO’s.,  something  they  had  promised  to  do.  The  CDO’s  turned  from  “going  concern”  to  
“liquidation” securities. The pricing fell of a cliff and many securities’ holders could not get out of the risks.  
Huge losses on savings were made. Banks got into trouble and interbank lending almost dried up. In the U.S,  
risk taking on house prices was further complicated by the government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae 
established in 1938 and Freddie Mac established in 1970 as well as by the Federal Housing Administration.  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac raise their funds by issuing Mortgage Backed Securities. The two entities were 
caught between a (small) percentage of individual households not keeping up with their mortgage payments 
or  they  themselves  defaulting  on  their  payment  obligations  to  the  mortgage  backed  securities  holders. 
Defaulting on the latter obligations would have made the whole U.S. housing market collapse. Subsequently 
Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac were put under U.S. government conservatorship in September 2008. The role 
of the FHA is to underwrite -insure- mortgage risks
From about 2005 onwards, major errors were made by the mortgage originators and by the mortgage risk  
distributors -the investment banks.
In the United States, economic system errors occurred in the years leading up to 2008. This was particularly 
the case in the decision making process in home mortgage lending. Such system errors can easily be traced 
back through four types of statistics: the foreclosure filings, the level of actual bank repossessions of homes,  
new housing starts and the price developments in the housing market.
The stress in the housing market in the U.S. can be measured in the annual levels of foreclosure filings,  
which  represent  actions  taken  by  lenders  when  borrowers  get  into  a  default  situation.  In  2005  such  
foreclosure filings were 801,563. In 2006 this level increased to 1.215,389, in 2007 the level reached 2.2 
million and in 2008 it moved to 3.1 million. In 2009 it became 3.46 million. In 2010 the level moved further 
up to3.84 million only to reach 3.92 million in 2011. In August 2012 it was still high at 193,508 in a month,  
or 1 in 681 housing units were affected by foreclosure filings. The highest stress level has been 1 in 298 
housing units and the lowest 1 in 317,498 units. The number of housing units repossessed by banks was 
269,000 in 2006, 489,000 in 2007, 679,000 in 2008, 945,000 in 2009, 1.125 million in 2010 and 1.147 
million in 2011.(Source: Statistic Brain.com)
Keeping up with payments on outstanding mortgages is one element of the housing market, new housing 
starts and home values are the other two elements.
The level of new housing starts -monthly figures on a seasonally adjusted annual rate- reached its peak in  
October 2007 at 1.264 million. In January 2008 it dropped to 1.084 million and a year later in January 2009  
it had more than halved to 490,000.(Source: Ycharts.com). The S&P Case Shiller home price index3 dropped 
from 170 by the end of 2007 till 139 a year later.
When new housing starts drop to half the level of a year earlier, this affects output, households income for 
those directly and indirectly involved in the home building business and thereby economic growth levels as 
well as unemployment levels. This drop in new housing starts also had a strongly negative effect on tax 
income for the U.S. government, especially in 2009 and 2010.
The repossessions of  homes  represent  a  different  category.  No longer  did banks wait  for  repayment  of  
mortgage debts out of an individual households’ income level, the repossessions meant that the banks moved  
3 http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-indices/en/eu/?indexId=spusa-cashpidff--p-
us----
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their action to the asset side of a household’s balance sheet. Once banks take possession of a home they will  
want to cut their losses on the property. It usually means that the net equity in the property has already been 
wiped out - a loss to a household’s net worth. Secondly the extra supply of “second hand” homes puts all 
home values under severe strain as evidenced by the drop in the S&P Case Shiller index in 2008. Such 
repossessions and sales do nothing for economic growth, as the houses have all been build in earlier periods, 
but they do affect households’ net worth values, through the change in speed of home values’ depreciation.
The mistake in granting mortgages to people who could not afford such mortgages is that 850,000 rather than 
269,000 used houses came on the market with a for sale sign in 2008. In total 4.4 million of such second  
hand houses came on the market in the five year period 2007-2011. On average 880 000 second hand houses 
per  annum came  to  the  market  over  this  period.  The  impact  of  collecting  mortgage  payments  out  of  
household’s incomes is bad enough for the families involved, but the impact of selling off 880 000 second 
hand homes annually for the last five years -the balance sheet method- has had a serious negative effect on 
all  78.6 million home owners in the U.S. The average U.S. home owner saw its home value drop from 
$289,000 by the end of 2006 till $205 000 by the end of 2011.  78.6 million home owners lost on average 
$84 000 of their savings -for many their main source of savings- over the five year period. The difference  
between the income recovery method and the balance sheet recovery method is immense. The first one only 
involves 5.5% of the home owners, the doubtful debtors, while the balance sheet method affects all 78.6  
million home owners.
The clash between the banks’ actions and the interests of their clients -the individual households- became  
evident in 2006 and even more so in 2007. On the one hand some banks and some originators were pushing  
sales of home mortgages without  due regards for risks.  Regretfully for prudent  banks,  the behaviour of 
imprudent lenders affects the prudent banks’ risk portfolios as well. The increased level of foreclosure filings 
in 2006, 2007 and 2008 showed that the banking system collectively had sold mortgages to people who  
could not afford it. They did not have the cash flow to service their debt. The forced house sale program 
spread the effects to all households owning a property and indirectly to all American households.
What one should note is that the mortgage periods agreed between banks and their clients do not coincide 
with the lifespan of a property. The mortgage periods will always be substantially shorter than the economic 
lifespan. Secondly home loans are often made on a variable interest rate basis, leaving individual households 
with a home related interest rate risk over their income levels. Usually households have no way of avoiding 
such risk. 
What forced sales of homes do is to shorten the financial lifespan of a home. Banks increase the speed of 
financial  depreciation of homes for their  own profit  motive;  while the individual  household’s  economic  
depreciation  stays  at  practically  the  same  level  (see  section  1.3).  Economic  and  financial  lifespan  
depreciation starts to deviate. This affects the net worth build up by individual households as retained in their 
own homes. The liability side of the individual household -the mortgage amount- does not change, but the  
asset  values  change.  This leaves the  individual  household with a  loss  in equity value:  the  value of  the  
households’ savings in their home. The economic value of living in one’s own home does not change for all  
practical purposes, but the potential financial buffer of their build up equity in their home changes. Bank’s 
actions to get out of the non-performing home loans through the balance sheet method, directly negatively 
affects the net equity position of all 78.6 million individual households who own a home and indirectly all 
American households. Irresponsible lending practises are translated into having a major negative impact on  
the financial net worth of all home owning individual households. A small group of doubtful home loan 
borrowers,  mainly  caused  by  irresponsible  lending  and  risk  transferring  practices  as  described  in  the  
Deutsche Bank study, make all individual households lose equity net worth in their homes, even for those 
who never borrowed a cent. The short term profit objective of banks led to huge home equity losses for  
individual  households  during  2008  and  following  years.  The  balance  sheet  actions  of  one  group  of  
institutions -the banks- negatively affected and still affect the net worth of all U.S home owners.
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1.3 Economic Life Span of Homes
The Balance Sheet approach requires to make an assessment of how home values should be depreciated.  
Accountants  and auditors,  whose job it  is  to  normally assess  such values,  do not  spend much time  on 
individual clients, as individual households usually do not require audited accounts.
If individual households were in a position to buy their home outright without relying on outside sources of  
funds, the question could be asked: What is the economic value of having the use of one’s own home? Is the 
value of living in one’s own home different from one year to the next? How should the acquisition price of 
the home be depreciated over time? Such question is all the more relevant if one considers the “What if”  
situation, whereby all households would have been able to buy their homes without any loans. The result  
would have been that the current balance sheet crisis would not have happened. The involvement of the 
financial markets did make it happen.
Four elements stand out: 
(1) Generally speaking the owner-occupier does not buy a home for it to be traded in a market place. The aim 
of acquiring a home is to live in it. If there is no aim to trade, there is also no market value as such. There is  
an acquisition price and a potential future sales value as and when the needs of the owner-occupier change 
and a different type of home is required.
(2) The economic life span of homes is usually at least fifty years and in many cases very much longer. Some 
homes need modernisation from time to time, but apart from occasional updating and common maintenance,  
homes require very little else. It is an asset which gives a benefit over an individual’s lifetime and sometimes 
longer than that.
(3) Usually -and this should be common practice- home owners pay back their mortgage loan on a monthly 
basis,  which  also  includes  an  element  of  saving.  The  savings  element  constitutes  the  owner’s  income 
contribution to his own balance sheet; it increases or should increase the net equity position of a household.  
The savings element can easily traced back to the Fed’s net worth data. From 1995 till and including 2005,  
the owners’ equity percentage in household real estate varied very little; with the variation between about 58 
and 60%. This happened in a period that the values of households’ real estate increased from $8.1 trillion in  
1995 till $22.0 trillion by the end of 2005. In 2006 the turn around came when the increase in the level of 
home  mortgages  exceeded the  value  increase  in  households’  real  estate  by about  $300 billion  and the  
owner’s equity level fell to 56.5%. The latter level continued to drop till the end of 2011 when it reached 
39.7%. From 2006, for the first time in a long period, American home owner households saw their equity  
investment  in their  own homes drop in value.  They reacted not  by saving less but  by saving more and  
borrowing less. Collectively American home owners changed their economic behaviour by actually reducing 
their  outstanding home loans amount by $1 trillion over the last five years or annually by, on average, $200 
billion.  In doing so,  they did not  increase the home loans level  annually by some $ 700 billion as was  
customary in the years up till 2006. Since 2007, the equity levels build up in the homes -the accumulated  
savings-  were  rewarded  with  a  very  high  “implied”  negative  rate  of  interest.  The  reasons  for  it  were 
explained in the previous section. A glimmer of hope has occurred in 2012.
(4)  In 1995 home values represented 28.5% of the total net worth of American households. By 2005 it had  
risen  to  36.0%.  This  happened  over  a  period  that  American  home  owners  had  been  able  to  maintain  
practically the same equity percentage over the whole period, in other words their savings efforts kept up  
with the homes’ values appreciations. Regretfully, due to factors beyond their control, this percentage did  
drop to 26.9% as per the end of the second quarter of 2012. Such percentages matter as they -combined with 
the  data  on  net  worth  and  households’  real  estate  values-  show  the  implicit  “interest  earnings”  over 
accumulated savings of one type of assets held by the American public: homes. Over the period 2006 till  
currently, this interest rate development showed an extremely negative reward for home savings. In figures 
for the three years 2006, 2007 and 2008 the home assets values minus home liabilities were respectively 
$12.389 trillion, $10.276 trillion and $7.043 trillion. These figures reflect the net equity -savings levels-  
incorporated in the U.S. households’ real estate for the three years. The return on equity -the implied interest  
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rate- in 2007 on homes was -17%; in 2008 another -31.4%. As stated before, the cause was not that the  
borrowing levels moved, but the asset values did. The collective individual households’ net equity level in  
homes in 2008 dropped below the year 2000’s equity level of $7.384 trillion. All figures are in current US  
dollars, which make the returns even worse for the 2008 figures. What one has to realise is that the banks 
might have given themselves the right to sell off other peoples’ homes, but home owners can collectively  
never exercise this right. They need a home and are the innocent victims of this flawed process. The whole 
home loan adjustment process reflects one of the flaws in the American econsystem; many other countries  
apply the same system as well.
The benefit of living in one’s own home -fully funded from own savings- cannot be expressed in money 
terms in the usual way. One saves rent payments, but why would one compare such savings with the return 
over the original cash lay-out as no rent payments (cash flow) take place? One also saves on the interest  
payments as there has been no borrowing. Again why would one apply current interest rate levels over a 
home acquisition which may have taken place years ago in a totally different interest rate environment? If  
rents and interest rates are not useful in assessing the value of the benefit of living in one’s own home, what  
is? The logical conclusion is to treat one’s home as an asset which is to be depreciated over its useful life.  
The only reasonable yardstick is an equal depreciation amount per annum based on the original purchase  
price,  corrected  only for  the  variation in  households’  real  estate  values  from one year  to  the  next,  but 
depreciated over the remaining life time.
A calculation example may make it clear. Assume Mr Johnson bought a home outright for U.S. $100,000 in 
2007 with an expected life span of say 50 years. This means the depreciation amount is U.S. $2,000 per 
annum. According to the U.S. Balance Sheet of Households as published by the Federal Reserve 4, home 
values dropped from $20.844 trillion in 2007 till $17.558 trillion in 2008, a drop of 15.8%. If this drop is  
spread out over the remaining lifetime of 49 years, this implies 0.322% per annum. Apply this to $2,000 and 
the depreciation amount becomes $1,993.56 per annum for the remaining 49 years. The dates of 2007 and 
2008 were chosen on purpose, as the drop in home valuation was the steepest for at least 25 years.
The variables for assessing the economic benefits of living in one’s own home are the acquisition price, the 
expected lifetime of the property, the level of home improvements and the level of changes in home values, 
however the latter corrected for the remaining life time period.
1.4 Economic implications
1.4.1 Individual Households
In 2006 owner occupied housing represented 34.6% of the total net worth of individual households in the  
U.S. The owners’ equity percentage in their homes stood at 56.5%. The events in 2007 should have alerted  
regulators and policy makers that something was going wrong. The equity percentage of owners’ real estate  
dropped to 49.3% and dropped further to 40.1% in 2008. In the household’s balance sheets the liability is 
non-variable -households generally cannot pay back home mortgages quicker than income levels permit- and 
the asset value became the variable. Collectively all  home owners did not enter into increased levels of  
borrowing in 2008, but they were punished by the actions of banks trying to get out of a small increase in  
doubtful  home  mortgages  via  the  balance  sheet  method.  What  one  should  consider  is  how such small 
percentage changes can have such a  great  impact.  The construction of  1.264 million  new homes  at  an  
annualised basis on the top of the market in October 2007 meant that the average lifespan of the newly build 
homes was 62.5 years. The latter represents the number of years it would take to replace the total owner  
occupied housing stock. By January 2009 with 490 000 new homes being build on a per annum basis, it 
meant that the average lifespan of the new homes had changed to 167 years. This change in lifespan shows 
how economic activity was not based on real factors but on a financial market driven liquidation sale. When 
households want to move, they offer their house for sale and generally buy another one. When banks force 
people out of their homes, there is no replacement factor. It has the same effect as if new homes come onto  
4 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pdf
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the market. Under such circumstances, builders of new homes cannot compete with banks; they are driven  
out of the market. One can no longer speak of normal market conditions if home builders are driven out of  
their jobs by bankers. The home value prices are based on false market information. They cannot be based on  
an average lifespan of 62.5 years at one moment and 15 months later at 167 years. 
The  application  of  the  balance  sheet  method  by the banks  -forced sales  of  homes-  had  another  highly  
undesirable side effect. Instead of rewarding savers for putting money aside to reduce their debt on the home,  
the balance sheet method application by the banks turned the return for all savers into major savings losses  
on an asset which should be regarded as safe as houses as pointed out in the previous section. The initial  
forced sale of homes in say 2008 also had a long lasting impact on the value and wisdom of putting more  
savings into the home, which individual households did to an extent of nearly $1 trillion between 2007 and 
the end of 2011. The latter repayment actions were basically intended to protect the asset -the home- in order  
to get the owners equity percentage back up to around 58% of homes. These actions were certainly not based 
on  steps  taken  to  improve  the  returns  over  existing  savings  locked up  in  the  home.  The  trend line  of 
increased collective borrowing for home financing to the extent around $700 billion per annum, which was 
customary till 2007, was broken and the owners collectively decided to pay back about $200 billion per 
annum from their mortgage debt from 2007 till currently.
Such a negative impact adds up to approximately $900 billion per annum, equivalent to about 6.5% of annual 
U.S. GDP. The increasing number of households and the increasing government budget deficits prevented 
such negative growth impact to stay at the level of -6.5%. However a preferable situation would have been to 
reverse  the  house  price  decline  quickly,  so  that  the  individual  households’  net  worth  levels  and  the  
government’s budgets would not have been so seriously affected in 2009, 2010 and 2011.
The latest figures of September 2012 show that, in the U.S., new home building is finally on the way up with 
an annualised volume of 872 0005 new homes being constructed. This brings the average lifespan down to 91 
years. House prices are also finally turning the corner with a 3% rise from the second quarter 2011 till the  
second quarter 2012.6  At the same time, the home ownership equity percentage also jumped to 43.1% in the 
second quarter of 2012 based on reduced borrowing levels and increased home values. Perhaps there is a 
glimmer of hope.
1.4.2 U.S Banks
Regretfully it is not the action of many, but the actions of a few, which spoil it for the rest of the banking  
sector. Aggressive sales techniques were not applied by all, but the herd instinct -called competition and 
bonuses-  induced  many  banks  to  follow  one  another.  A  newspaper7‘s  headlines  of  25th October  2012 
encapsulate banks’ actions very well. “Banks could face thousands of new claims over mis-sold interest rate  
swaps”; “Bank of America faces $1 billion lawsuit over Hustle mortgages related to Countrywide,  once  
America’s  biggest  mortgage  lender”;  “Royal  Bank  of  Scotland  agrees  to  settle  with  Nevada’s  attorney 
general  after  an investigation into its  US ‘reckless’  mortgage  loans”;  “Ex-Goldman  director  jailed over 
trading”; “SocGen rogue trader loses appeal over Euro 4.9 billion fraud” and finally “Small businesses have  
‘vital’ overdraft limits cut by banks”. The same newspaper also carried the headline”More protection for  
’mortgage prisoners’ at mercy of lender”.
This one day selection of headlines shows that banks both in the U.S. and in Europe have been acting  
strongly in their own short term interests rather than in that of their clients. In the case of the U.S. home  
mortgages, the banks’ balance sheet related actions had very negative effects on nearly all the individual  
households’ net worth levels and thereby on economic growth levels in the U.S.  Banks did shoot themselves 
in the foot by their own -short-sighted- actions. 
5 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-17/housing-starts-in-u-s-surged-in-september-to-four-year-high.html
6 http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/24216/q22012hpi.pdf
7 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
9
                                                                                The World’s Dream: Economic Growth - The Balance Sheet Approach © Drs Kees de Koning
The flaws in the U.S. econsystem as applied by the banks in the home mortgage market  involve all  the 
elements as set out in the Deutsche Bank study plus a few more. They are:
(1)  38%  of  the  subprime  mortgages  required  no  down  payment.  One  is  not  serious  about  bank  risk 
management if only one side -the lender- takes all income risks and the borrower does not give up any of his 
savings. This bankers’ method forced the risks towards an excessive reliance on the asset: the home.
(2) 37% were interest only mortgages. Again the risk is skewed against the income method as no equity  
buffer is build up and reliance for repayments becomes practically totally dependant on the value of the  
asset. Both lender and borrower gamble upon a rising house price, the wrong type of long term funding. 
From a household perspective the principal loan amount does not decrease.
(3) Banks and mortgage sellers were not serious in that in the case of 43% of the subprime mortgages no  
proof of income was required. Self certification is not the best method to check whether the borrower can 
afford the loan servicing. Again such lack of bank integrity showed that the banks attached more importance  
to home values than to the income flows of their customers.
(4) 80% of the mortgages granted were mortgages which had a build in steep hike in mortgage interest rate  
applicable after the initial period of some 2 years. This risk is of course a risk taken by the borrower, but  
again the lenders failed in their stress tests of the clients’ income flows. Again this action pattern collectively  
pushes the risk taking towards the balance sheet approach, the home value.
(5) Investment banks with the support of the credit rating agencies multiplied the risks by transferring such 
risks to domestic and international buyers via CDO’s.  Again the gamble was totally skewed towards house  
prices going up, rather than coming down. Foreign buyers, but also American money market funds did not  
and could not  check on the ability of  individual  households to repay the mortgages.  They believed the 
promises as made by the investment bankers and the credit rating agencies. In many cases the CDO holders  
did not even have a legal title over the mortgages. Such promises were broken by the sellers: the investment  
bankers.
The drop in house prices caused by the actions of some U.S. banks also required the U.S. government to  
come to the rescue of two main supporters in the home acquisition process in the U.S.: Fannie Mae and 
Freddy Mac. This happened in September 2008. The role of these entities is well spelled out in a study 8 made 
in 2010 by the Congressional Budget Office and called: “Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac and the Federal Role in  
the  Secondary  Mortgage  Market”.  This  role  is  hugely  important  as  in  2009  three  quarters  of  all  new 
residential mortgages got either a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac involvement according to the study. Together  
with the Federal Housing Administrations’ role of insuring against home loan risks, the current situation is  
that 95% of all new mortgages have a link to these three institutions.
1.4.3 Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac and the Balance Sheet Approach
Prevention is better than a cure. The reason that Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac got into trouble in 2008 is that  
these institutions carried both the income related risks on individual households -the credit risks, the liability 
side of households’ balance sheets- as well as the funding risks for the asset side of households -the homes.  
This sounds logical, but it is not necessarily the case. In covering both the income and the asset risks, the  
combined risks taking became the institutions’ Achilles Heel during 2008.
Fannie Mae was established just after the Great Depression of the 1930’s. Its aim and that of Freddie Mac as 
well, is to provide liquidity, stability and affordability to all American households who wish to purchase a  
home. For many years this role was fulfilled with great success. However the success was undermined when  
investment banks saw an opportunity to privatise the risks associated with home mortgage lending. From 
8 http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12032/12-23-fanniefreddie.pdf
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being sidelined during the run up to the crash in 2008, the return of the three institutions has been impressive 
as they currently cover some 95% of all new mortgages granted.
Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac buy home loans from banks and other mortgage originators provided they meet 
strict  standards  all  related  to  sensible  mortgage  risks  decisions.  They  subsequently  package  them into 
mortgage-backed securities and they guarantee that principal and interest are paid on time to the outside  
investors. Currently they fund or guarantee about $5 trillion out of a $9.6 trillion home mortgage market  
(second quarter data 2012). With an involvement in 95% of new mortgages granted, their relative position  
will improve even further. In section 4.3. some recommendations will be formulated in line with the Balance  
Sheet approach. Such recommendations will  be set off against other proposals which have already been  
made in order to reorganise the home loan structure in the U.S.
Apart  from the study by the Congressional  Budget  Office,  many scholars have studied and made  clear  
proposals on how Fannie Mae,  Freddie Mac and the FHA should all  be fitted together.  The Center for  
American Progress has funded its own group of experts and it has set out a list of another 21 proposals9.
2. The U.S. Government and the Balance Sheet Approach
2.1 Assets, Liabilities and Income
In  the  U.S.  the  Government  publishes  a  Citizen’s  Guide  to  the  Financial  Report  of  the  United  States 
Government. The latest version covers 2011.10
Before setting out to what happened to the U.S. Government’s Budget, a few remarks need to be made about  
the character of a government as an economic household. Governments around the world are in some ways 
like individual households, they are mainly income and expenditure oriented. They are however unique in 
that being a government household, they can borrow funds in the financial markets, in case income levels do 
not suffice to meet expenditure levels. Governments are also unique in that they create debt - a balance sheet  
item-  which  is  not  covered  by Ministers  paying  such  debt  back  out  of  their  own  incomes,  but  by the 
collective of individual households having the responsibility of paying more taxes in the future.  All private  
sector households -companies and individuals- can only borrow against their own future income levels or to 
a limited extent against their asset values. This limits the private sector borrowing capacity. Governments 
generally do not build up huge assets’ bases. In the case of the U.S. its asset base as mentioned in the  
Citizen’s Guide was $2.7 trillion per 30 September 2011 on an income base of $2.4 trillion. The same report  
mentions that the total Government debt per same date was $14.8 trillion. The Congressional Budget Office  
reckons -as a preliminary figure- that the government debt increased by $1.09 trillion in fiscal year 2011-
2012,  bringing the current  debt  level  up to  $15.9 trillion.  The ratio of  government  debt  to government  
income level is around 6.6 times. The U.S applies a Federal Debt Ceiling level, which leads to substantive 
discussions in Congress before a new bill increasing the ceiling is approved.
The Citizen’s Guide also issued a warning: “If budget deficits continue to occur, the Government will have 
to  borrow more  from the public.  Instances  where the  debt  held by the public  increases  faster  than the  
economy for extended periods can pose additional challenges”.
What is striking is the extent to which the Government of the U.S. has become the victim of the home  
mortgage debacle, just like home owners. In 2008 the budget deficit nearly tripled from $163 billion in 2007 
till $455 billion in 2008. As a consequence of the home mortgage debacle it tripled again in 2009 till $1.42 
trillion. It came somewhat down to practically $1.3 trillion in both 2010 and 2011.
9 http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/housing/news/2012/08/02/12025/the-5-trillion-question-what-should-we-do-
with-fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac/
10 http://www.gao.gov/financial/fy2011/11guide.pdf
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In the above, the negative influence from the households drop in home values was calculated as a loss of  
around 6.5% of GDP per annum based on individual households reducing their absolute home loans level by 
practically $1 trillion over the period 2007-2011 and also by not taking up the usual annual increase in home  
loans as was common between 1996 and 2006 of around $700 billion per annum.  These actions had a  
negative impact on GDP of about $900 billion per annum.  
Such negative influences showed up on the Revenues side. In 2009 the actual Revenues dropped by $463 
billion as compared to 2008. Taking into account that Revenues would have grown with the economy by 
some 1.5% per annum, the Revenue drop should also include about $40 billion due to the lower economic 
growth effect. This led to about a $500 billion drop in Revenues. The actual budget deficit was $962 billion 
more than in 2008, which means that the “automatic stabilisers” implied an extra expense of $462 billion for  
the U.S. Government in 2009.
What the subsequent two years 2010 and 2011 showed was that only a very minor improvement took place 
in the budget deficit during these years. The asset based home value adjustments, forced through by the 
banking sector, continued practically unimpeded; as a consequence both individual households were faced 
with a severe loss on savings accumulated in the homes and the government continued to face revenue losses 
and additional expenditures at an increased level from previous years. 
If,  as stated in the introduction, the drop in home values could have been avoided and the net worth of  
individual households would have improved in line with the experience of 1996 till 2006 with $3.2 trillion  
per annum in Country Profit - the net savings level of all individual households-, than it would have been 
very likely that the government’s budget deficit would not have increased by the $962 billion as it did in  
2009 compared to 2008, but by a very much smaller amount. The same applies for 2010 and 2011 and also 
for the figures when they become known for 2012. One can make an estimate of the impact of the balance  
sheet crisis on government debt over the period 2007 till the end of fiscal year 2011. In 2007 the budget  
deficit  was $163 billion on government  revenues of $2.63 trillion or 6.1% of revenues.  If this  line had 
continued the Federal government deficit funding needs would have been some $3.8 trillion less over this 
period (2007-2011) than they actually were. 
A more immediate problem is that tax concessions on the income side are coming to an end on 31 December 
2012 raising both individual and corporate taxes, while at the same time expenditure cuts are also to be  
implemented over the next fiscal year. This problem is often referred to as the fiscal cliff. According to the  
Congressional Budget Office the corrections to the Federal Government income and expenditure levels is 
expected  to  lead  to  a  budget  deficit  reduction  of  $607 billion  or  4% of  GDP from January 2013  and 
stretching into 2014. As elections for President and Members of Congress have just been concluded, it is too 
early to say if a compromise solution will be reached between Democrats and Republicans before the end of  
2012 or that these matters will drag on into 2013. The only observation one can make is that the negative 
influence on economic growth arising from the forced sales of homes is just starting to become slightly less,  
as evidenced by the latest data, but that the growth of the four other main elements of Country Profit apart  
from homes: Corporate equities, Mutual fund shares, Pension fund reserves and Equities in noncorporate 
business seem still to be in a rather fragile state. These elements together represent 56.8% of the total net  
worth of all individual households as per the end of the second quarter 2012. The savings rewards over 
corporate equities, mutual funds and pension funds are still in negative territory and it is recommendable that  
those matters are first remedied before major changes are implemented in taxation levels.
With the statistical database available from the Federal Reserve on individual households net worth, with the  
Citizen’s guide to the 2011 Financial Report of the United States Government and some other databases, it  
has been relatively easy to analyse how economic developments took place and what could have happened if  
the home asset conversion into cash had not occurred or occurred at a much slower pace. It is another matter 
to see which policy actions could be taken under the current circumstances to help increase economic growth 
with -in the background- a U.S. government which needs to reduce its deficit at the same time and perhaps 
even starts to consider how to gradually repay some of its debt. In the next Section attention will be paid to 
three other aspects which influence Country Profit levels. They are Time and Savings deposits, Corporate 
and Equity in noncorporate business and Pension Fund reserves.
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3 Country Profit Generators
3.1 Time and Saving Deposits and Money Market Fund Shares
In times of economic upheaval one can expect that individual households will adopt a cautionary attitude to  
risks. The Balance Sheet data on Individual Households as supplied by the Fed confirms this. Time and 
savings deposits plus money market  fund shares, both reflecting the short term liquidity that households 
prefer to maintain, did increase in absolute and even more so in relative terms, the latter as a consequence of  
dropping house and share prices. For instance the combined assets in deposits and money market funds were  
$6.6 trillion in 2006, $7.3 trillion in 2007, $7.7 trillion in 2008 and $7.6 trillion in 2009. The precautionary  
motive was clearly present as interest rates on short term deposits dropped since 2007, but this obviously did 
not deter households to improve their short term savings relative to their total savings. Per the end of the 
second quarter of 2012 the combined asset level of these two items reached practically $8 trillion.
One element is the reward over these savings. While most of the deposits with banks are safe in the sense 
that a loss of principal amount is unlikely with the deposit insurance schemes, they are not safe from a 
reward point of view. The current level of interest received over short term time deposits is less than the  
inflation level in the U.S., implying a real negative interest rate reward.
3.2 Corporate and Equity in noncorporate business
The clear conclusion out of the Balance Sheet of Individual Households is that the value of the corporate  
equities and the equity in noncorporate business together was higher in 2007 than it was as per the end of the  
second quarter 2012. The actual figures are $18.85 trillion as per end of 2006 and $16.9 trillion currently.  
The Dow Jones Industrial  Index was 14 165 in October 2007 and stands to-day -7 November 2012- at  
exactly 13 000, which represents a drop of 8.3%. The equity values of both corporate and noncorporate  
businesses, which represent all companies, dropped by 10.4%.over practically the same period. Such values  
represent one of the main balance sheet items of individual households. Companies through their activities  
employ many, many workers who make a living out of the production process. Companies create incomes  
for  employees  and  pay  dividends  to  shareholders,  both  elements  are  contributors  to  economic  growth.  
Companies and their employees also pay tax which allows the government to spend. Companies in their 
contributions to Defined Benefit pension schemes also help individuals save to create a pension pot.
The  income  items  -  salaries  and  wages,  taxes,  and  dividends-  helped  economic  growth.  The  company 
contributions to building up pension pots for their employees helped company income being turned into  
assets for future use. The total result of all company activities in the U.S. over the last five years was not that  
companies did not create profits and shared income between employees and shareholders, but that the net  
result  of  all  these  activities  did  not  add  value  according  to  the  national  balance  sheet  of  individual  
households. The return over the savings invested in the U.S. company sector turned negative over the last  
five years.
One article in the U.K. Daily Telegraph of November 3, 2012 showed this fact extremely clearly. It stated:  
“If one would have invested £1,000 five years ago in the shares of Britain’s biggest banks they would now 
be worth for HSBC £810, for Bank Santander £534, for Barclays £452, for Lloyds Banking Group £83, and 
for Royal Bank of Scotland £58.” Banks, on both sides of the Atlantic, have not looked particularly well after 
their savers over the last five years. This fact has been extended to all company values together.
One can safely assume that if demand levels would have been higher over the last five years -implying a  
higher  rate  of economic  growth- then the combined values of  companies  would have shown a positive 
growth pattern.
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3.3 Pension Fund Reserves
Nothing exemplifies the level of savings so much in a society as the pension funds’ reserves. They are the  
balance sheet item from which individual households hope to draw a decent income once they retire. They 
are assets on which income will be released far away in the future for the younger generations. Their assets  
include: shares, government and corporate bonds. All pension assets are owned by individual households. 
These assets may be managed collectively but the right to a specific pension amount is fixed in a pension  
agreement and is often subject to investment results even for Defined Benefit schemes.
The OECD publishes an annual overview of the pension fund situation around the world, called Pension 
Markets in Focus11. A number of aspects highlighted in this review deserve particular attention.
The first element is scale or size of the pension sector compared with GDP levels. To start with the U.S.,  
while the U.S. -among all countries in the world- does not have the highest savings ratio as compared to  
GDP -its ratio was 70.5% of GDP in 2011- in absolute terms with $13.1 trillion in savings as per the end of 
2011,  it  represented 65.1% of all pension fund reserves in the world. The latter level was $20.1 trillion as  
per end 2011. Countries with a higher ratio of pension savings relative to the size of their GDP as compared  
to the U.S. are: The Netherlands 138.2%, Switzerland 110.8, Australia 92.8%, the United Kingdom 88.2% 
and Finland 75.0%. One may note that for the U.S., individual retirement accounts have not been included in 
these figures. Towers Watson in their global pensions’ asset study 201212 estimates such IRA’s to be worth 
$2.93 trillion as per the end of 2011.
The second element is the return on assets. One element which needs highlighting is the accounting issue for 
the returns on assets, the income level out of assets. Pension funds are obliged by the pension supervisory 
agencies to “mark-to-market” their mainly government and some other bond portfolios. In the declining long 
term interest rate environment -as happened especially over the last five years- pension funds have had to  
book capital gains. Such drop in interest rates has happened in the U.S. but also in the stronger European 
countries including the U.K. and the Northern Eurozone countries. The implication has been that government 
bond values held in pension fund reserves increased for no other reason than that new issues came out with a 
lower  interest  rate  than  the  prevailing  average  interest  rates  on  the  bonds  held  in  the  pension  funds’ 
portfolios. The result:  pension funds booked gains on the balance sheet;  capital gains which made them 
temporarily look better.  The reverse effect will  happen when long term interest rates will start going up  
again. However, simultaneously when booking the capital gains or losses, new contributions come in. These 
need to be invested at the interest rate of the day. As contributions out of incomes are only a small proportion  
of pension assets build up over time, their effect on the overall yield cannot outweigh the capital gains or  
losses booked over the whole bond portfolio. 
For pension funds, which have at least a 40 year time horizon, the aim is to build up financial assets for  
future use. With this aim in mind, only those gains should be booked which are in line with keeping assets to  
maturity; therefore not a mark-to-market valuation, but a “mark-to-maturity” one. For pension funds income 
gains have a much greater long term value than short term capital gains. Pension funds prefer or should 
prefer a higher real reward in current cash terms over accounting gains or losses.
It is for this reason that the pension fund industry was generally unhappy with quantitative easing practices 
as the latter suppresses interest rates to very low levels, while the risks to individual households -the total 
size of a government’s debt- does not decrease.  In fact, government debt levels in many countries have risen  
rather rapidly over the last five years.
11 http://www.oecd.org/finance/privatepensions/pensionmarketsinfocus.htm
12 http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/6267/Global-Pensions-Asset-Study-2012.pdf
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4. Policy Considerations.
4.1 Introduction
An “Econsystem” is a complex set of different types of households, which each make their own financial  
decisions, but whereby the decisions made by one type of household is dependent on what other households 
decide. Some decisions may harm others, which may have an effect on everyone.
In 1934, after the Great Depression, deposit insurance was introduced in the U.S. The aim was to protect the  
public that in case of a bank going bankrupt their cash would be safe. The 2008 crisis showed that banks can 
also seriously damage customers’ wealth and the whole economy by moving from an income based lending  
programme to an asset based system. Customers’ cash may be safe, but their savings in their homes were 
certainly not. Individual households lost on average 28.9% of their savings in their homes, since 2007. The 
cumulative effect of this risk to savings was spread via the reactions of the individual households. They  
started to save more in order to protect their homes and borrow less for new home building. The effects of  
the value drop in housing affected the banks and insurers themselves. Some of them had to be rescued. It  
affected Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac and they had to be rescued.  The cumulative effect spread to the U.S.  
government which experienced a substantial drop in its tax revenues and through the “automatic stabilisers” 
an increase in expenditure. This led to exceptional budget deficits in relation to its tax revenues level.  It also 
spread to lower demand levels for goods and services, which caused another wealth factor to occur. 
Since 2008 individual households’ savings in companies in the U.S. accounted for another loss, in this case a  
loss of 10.4%. Furthermore it spread -through the flight to safety for cash holdings plus the quantitative 
easing exercise- in lower and lower long term interest rates notwithstanding rapidly rising government debt  
levels. Such long term interest rates are currently rewarding savers at a level below inflation levels. Finally it 
spread to individual households’ savings for the future through their pension funds. In 2008 such pension  
funds lost 22.3% of their values and this figure included new contributions made in 2008. The actual loss 
was higher The saddest element of all is that this loss on savings not only affects people’s wealth levels, but  
also their ability to find jobs and earn their way out of the crisis. It led to much higher unemployment levels.  
In May 2007 the unemployment level was 4.2% of the labour force. It rose to 10% in November 2009 to 
drop back to 7.9% in October 2012. This still leaves 12.3 million American people unemployed.
When savings do no longer earn a positive return in a society, one has to question the set up of the structure  
of the econsystem. Which elements need to change?
In the U.S Econsystem review a number of elements will be considered:  
• The flaws in the set up of the banking system, which gave rise to such mismanagement of the economy, 
• The flaws in the mortgage lending system and the role of Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac therein, 
• The flaws in the adjustment process for a faster pace of economic growth, including the possible role of 
     pension funds,
• The timing of the government budgetary measures, and finally 
• The flaws in the government bond interest rate policies.
The U.S. is an excellent example to illustrate how an Econsystem works as both its data supply and the  
extent of its domestic market are second to none. However the lessons which may be learned from the U.S’  
experience may apply to a smaller or larger extent to Europe as well.
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4.2 Flaws in the Banking Structure
What is a surprising is that the Fed and other U.S. regulators as well as all international bank regulators seem 
to focus so strongly on bank balance sheets and so little on bank profit levels. Banks are different from most  
companies in that their only “product” is managing other people’s monies. Banks’ profits consist of paying 
less for monies entrusted to them -the liabilities side- than they receive on their loans to customers less the  
provisions  for  doubtful  debtors  -the  asset  side.  They  also  earn  commissions  on  facilitating  domestic 
payments, foreign exchange and securities trading. Finally they gamble on financial markets for their own 
account. 
In the past when banks did make accounting gains by providing in an insufficient manner for future loan 
losses, the bank managements awarded themselves large bonuses. When bank losses were made, it was up to 
the shareholders to cover the losses and finally in a number of cases up the state on behalf of all taxpayers; a  
strange game of if I win according to my accounting practices you pay me and if I lose you lose. This  
practice represents a very unsatisfactory state of affairs and reflects a very inappropriate distribution of risks.
If banks had no equity base, they could and should still be profitable. What banks should do is establish an  
economic balance sheet and profit and loss account. The difference between these accounts and the audited  
accounts lies in the treatment of risk provisions. When risks are taken on any customer base, the logical 
assumption is that some of these risks will turn out to become doubtful. From the day the risks are incurred,  
the provision policy for an economic balance sheet and P/L approach should be that a percentage of such  
risks are reserved out of the annual gross income base of the year that the risks are started and for any  
subsequent year that the risks are on the books. Selling of risks to other parties should only be recognised if  
such other parties take over the full responsibility for the loans, including the straight diversion of cash flows  
and legal documentation from their clients to the new risk takers. Banks -including investment banks- should  
not get away with transferring risks to other fund providers if the client’s cash flows and legal documentation  
still run through the selling bank’s books.  
For instance in the case of U.S. home mortgages, the five year experience showed that 5.5% of all mortgages  
became doubtful. By dividing the risks into sub risks for different income classes, the banks could work out  
which percentage of the total outstanding home mortgage portfolio would be affected. Let us assume that 4% 
of the total portfolio would be affected over a five year period. This requires a risk provision of 0.8% per  
annum to be put  aside out  of  profits  for covering potential  future losses in the economic balance sheet  
approach. The interest margin between the lending portfolio and the funds utilised should accommodate such  
provision element. The interest margin plus the commission income should also cover the costs of salaries 
etc. 
Even commissions income can constitute a major source of risks. In the U.K., banks have now had to admit  
that about £11 billion of commissions “earned” on payment protection insurance has had to be repaid to 
customers; as such insurance policies were mis-sold. In above economic balance sheet and P/L accounts,  
provisions should have made as soon as these products were started to be sold.
Banks do not  need an equity base to  take risks.  They are  “only”  risk intermediaries  between the fund  
providers and the borrowers. They should achieve a profit margin after proper provisioning takes place and  
all staff and other costs are paid. Banks can and should survive on basis of net current incomes and on the  
confidence customers have in bank managers knowing what they are doing. 
The equity base -a balance sheet item- only confuses the risk taking process -which is an income based  
activity. Banks are much more like individual households than they are like production companies. The latter  
companies need equity resources to fund their capital goods, their long term assets. Banks have very little in 
terms of “capital goods”, apart from computers and bank buildings and both could be leased rather than 
bought outright.
Relating risks to shareholders equity rather than to income levels restricts banks for no other reason than that  
some investors need to have sufficient confidence in the managerial expertise of bank managers to provide  
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them with additional equity resources. In the current market climate, the managerial teams of many banks 
seem to have lost the confidence of the investing public, especially as some major banks had to be rescued 
by the taxpayers. The experience over the last five years has not inspired confidence. If nothing changes why 
would the future look any different?
Relating risks to immediate risk provisioning levels within the income based method solves two problems:  
The income base of the banks absorbs the potential loan losses, rather than having the luxury of having 
outside investors paying for bankers’ errors. Risk provisioning forces bankers to properly account for risks 
taken. If done well, the skills of bank managements will shine; they can be rewarded for such skill, if not  
they cannot expect the remuneration levels some are used to. Well run banks can expand their business 
without the need for outside capital resources; less well run banks will need to up their game.
What one may do is  to split  the income from the balance sheet method for banks. The income method 
recommends that banks pay a premium for subordinated debt. The income method should also stipulate that  
such premium is always payable. The balance sheet method is to have a funding type for a bank which may 
be written up or down if gains or losses are made.  One funding structure which would fit into the income 
based method and make bank profits even clearer is to gradually replace bank share equity with perpetual 
notes which pay a fixed return. These notes could over time fully replace bank equity as the ultimate buffer 
to risk taking.  The notes values may be written down or back up to 100% of the issue price for accounting 
purposes  -a  balance  sheet  item-  but  the  reward  -an  expenditure  item-  could  remain  at  the  same  level 
compared to the original issue price, say 5% of each $1000.-  note per annum. If these notes would be  
publicly traded, it would show which banks manage their risks best. It is easy to convert existing bank shares 
into perpetual notes, simply by fixing the dividend policy. If this policy is set that always say 5% of the value 
at a date to be set will be paid to share holders, irrespective of the results of the bank, than the same result  
will have been achieved as if perpetual notes would have been issued.
.
If profits -according to the income method- were chosen as the lead indicator for banks to do business, than 
the restrictions on banks to do such business would not come from a lending ratio against equity levels, but  
from provisioning rules for banks which make too low a provision for certain risks. The earlier method 
punishes the shareholders of the banks -the evidence over the last five years shows by how much that has  
already happened- the latter method holds the managements of the banks to account.
If above income method had been applied to U.S. banks from before 2006, the provisions would have been  
in place to gradually absorb losses rather than force home asset sales through in a very short period of time.  
Banks would have been better off.  So would have been their customer base: the individual households. Also  
the companies would have seen their sales levels kept up and the government would not have had to rescue 
banks and see its own tax income drop while government expenses went up.
Perhaps a final remark on bank risk taking. Investment banks trade in risk products. The financial markets  
-the individual households who supply all funds to all users- would be better off if the income method is  
applied to all banks, including investment banks. One should not be able to sell risks to the markets and carry 
no responsibility for the losses caused by such action. Provisioning for future losses incurred by the markets  
should be a proper method for trading in risks, be they derivatives trading, stock market listings, mergers and  
acquisitions, collateralising risks taken by selling mortgage obligations or risks incorporated in other fixed 
income obligations. If such provisioning method had also been applied to investment banks during the years  
up till 2008, investment banks could not possibly have sold the levels of risks they did; they also could not  
have rewarded their bankers for actions which led to huge losses on savings for the 78.6 million U.S. home  
owners.
Segregation of investment banks from retail banks will help little in reducing the overall financial risk taking 
in a society. Until all banks and other financial intermediaries are forced into the income method, risks will  
pop up in unexpected places without proper risk provisioning. Why should individual households need to act  
as  the  ultimate  fund  providers  for  carrying  such  risks  when  neither  the  banks  themselves  nor  their 
supervisors were capable of containing the banking’ risks. The income method would force banks in the right 
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direction, including for risk provisioning for derivatives trading. It works like a product guarantee, rather  
than being based on broken promises for which there was no penalty.
To ensure that provisioning takes place properly in an economic balance sheet and profit and loss account, 
the tasks for auditors need to be expanded. The government should play a role in this, for instance the Fed 
could appoint which auditing firm establishes the economic accounts for what bank. Of course, the costs of  
the audit have to be repaid to the Fed by the bank concerned. Such a system avoids potential conflicts of 
interest between auditing firms and the banks.
4.3 The Flaws in the Mortgage Lending Process
What  the Congressional  Budget  Office  study did not  consider and neither did the Center for  American  
Progress’ expert group proposals or any of the 21 other proposals, is to reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
by separating the role of funder of home mortgages -the balance sheet part of the transaction- and the role of 
taking on the credit risks -the income related part of the home mortgage process. In funding -especially with  
a net worth guarantee from the Federal Government- funds could be attracted for the longest periods of time  
and at the lowest fixed interest rates. Both Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac have a competitive advantage over  
private sector banks and this advantage could be transferred to the home buyers, via the banks. The banks 
would take on the credit risks on the home buyers, but funding would only be made available for products 
that Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac approve of. The banks will provide a bank guarantee to Fannie May and 
Freddy Mac for the full amount of the funding plus accumulated interests. Non-performance on a mortgage  
loan is the bank’s business; the bank will still have to service the debt to Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac. 
This also provides the opportunity to grant powers to Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac to jointly agree on the  
required reserve requirements -or risk provisioning requirements if banks are judged on the income based 
methods- that banks need to maintain against their home loans’ related credit risks. If banks behave in an  
orderly manner in line what the market can absorb -funding homes and new home buildings in line with  
average lifespan and in line with the increases in numbers of individual households- the reserve requirement  
can be set at 0%, making it attractive to banks to lend for home buying purposes. If however aggressive 
banking behaviour is noticed, the 0% could be increased to slow down such behaviour. If the income method 
is applied, aggressive behaviour would lead to instructions for more provisioning. An ultimate course of  
action is that both Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac -for a short period of time- stop lending for homes to banks  
which do not fall into line. If the collective of banks misbehaves, total lending could be stopped for a short  
while. 
If Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac would be following above approach, they will become both the preferred 
source of funds for individual households acquiring homes as well as the protector of wealth creation in this 
asset area for them. Such a role would be of utmost importance for the U.S. economy in general.
The balance sheet approach to individual households ties in very well with the original objectives of Fannie 
May and Freddy Mac.  These objectives are:  providing liquidity,  stability and affordability to individual  
households. How this can work is set out below.
To start with liquidity: Banks and other mortgage lenders require funding from the financial markets. By the 
very nature of their private sector ownership, their funding base consists to a large extent of short term 
deposits  which  are  rolled  over.  These  funds,  plus  some  longer  term funds,  are  used  to  provide  home 
mortgages. Banks do not want to expose themselves to sizeable interest rate mismatch risks. They  transfer 
such risks to their borrowers -the individual households- by lending on a variable interest rate basis. For  
home buyers this can constitute a major risk factor when income growth does not keep up with mortgage  
payments. The practice of low start up interest rate levels for a couple of years, followed by major interest  
hikes, was one of the main factors for the current mortgage disaster.
Banks are restricted in what they can do on their asset side, among others for extending home loans, in how 
they can fund themselves.  For this reason, they cannot easily offer  30 or more years  fixed interest  rate  
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mortgages; they need profits and an equity base (or preferably  accumulated loan loss reserves ) to absorb 
potential losses on loans; their competition drive can lead to undesirable risks being accepted for short term 
gains. Such gains can turn into macro-economic losses: reductions in Country Profit levels or even outright  
Country Losses. 
As stated above, Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac are ideally placed to attract very long term fixed interest rate  
funds from the financial markets at the lowest possible market costs if the U.S. Government continues to  
undertake to provide a net worth guarantee to both institutions, which it already did in 2008. Such liquidity 
can be used to support individual households to acquire a home with long term fixed interest rate mortgages 
at the lowest possible rates. Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac are not ideally placed to absorb credit risks on  
home loans;  this  should remain the responsibility of the banks.  The latter  know -or should know- their  
customers best.
The  second  element  is  affordability.  Affordability  is  clearly  aimed  at  the  individual  household.  Four 
elements play a role here: the mortgage period, the monthly amounts payable, the mortgage transferability 
and the flexibility to prepay some of the amounts due.
Generally speaking the working life period, say from the age of 20 till 67, is the maximum period in which a 
mortgage should be redeemed. For convenience sake one may assume a maximum mortgage period of 40 
years. The mortgage loans can be structured so that the financial burden to repay the mortgage stays equal  
over the lifetime of the mortgage, i.e. amortisations. Such amortisations reduce the repaid principal sum in 
the early stages of the loan and increase them in the latter stages. If a household buys a home before the  
future owner is 27, a forty year mortgage may be granted. The mortgage period could be reduced by the  
number of years that the householder is older than 27. The length of the mortgage period and the system  
application of amortisations lead to the highest possible level of affordability, with the least chances of loan 
defaults. The third element deals with mortgage transferability. It is obvious that home owners may want to 
move from time to time for work reasons, for personal reasons like marriage or divorce or for some other life  
factors. If such reason does not require continuation of the mortgage Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac may  
accept  such reason. If,  on the other hand the aim has clearly been property speculation on home prices  
-“flipping practices”- than the shorter the mortgage period has been, the higher the penalty fee for prepaying 
the mortgage should be. The fourth element introduces the flexibility to repay additional amounts at times  
when the householder is in a position to do so. This flexibility helps the householder to increase his home  
equity  base  sooner.  Of  course  some  of  the  risks  should  be  with  the  individual  household.  They are  a 
minimum down payment of 5 or 10% of the acquisition price, so no 100% mortgages. Secondly no interest 
only mortgages, which in any case will not be needed as the mortgage periods are being extended. Thirdly  
and finally a proof of income needs to be provided, no self certification.
Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac are ideally placed to provide such funding to the individual households via the  
distribution channel of the banks and other mortgage providers. Over time both institutions will build up an 
experience level of how much needs to be borrowed in 10 or in 30 years funding. Some funding-lending 
mismatch risk may exist for a while, but this is a risk worth taking in order to achieve the next element:  
stability.  This  potential  mismatch  risk  is  covered  by  the  taxpayers  anyway,  but  such  risk  is  minimal  
compared to the distortion of the housing markets as happened over the last five years.
The third element is stability. Here Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae can be of great importance. If the credit  
risk on the customer stays with the banks and other mortgage providers and the two institutions provide 
liquidity to the banks according to the affordability principles as set out above: fixed amounts per months, 
escrow accounts for insurance and government taxes on homes, full amortisations over the total loan period 
and the option of early partial prepayments, than the most stable elements on the affordability level are build  
in into the system. With a lower overall risk profile, the Government may give Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac 
the collective power to decide about how banks are behaving on the home loan front. They may reward the 
positive collective behaviour of banks by granting them a temporary waiver of equity reserve requirements 
against home loans; the tariff for home loans to be set at 0%. If banks collectively act conservatively in 
granting home loans, such waiver may stay in place. In aggressive home loan sales periods, a higher level of  
reserve requirements  may be introduced.  Low risk behaviour is  rewarded with no reserve requirements,  
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aggressive  sales  techniques  with  strict  reserve  requirements  or  under  the  income  method  higher  risks 
provisions. Finally Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac have the “nuclear” option of temporarily halting all new 
mortgage funding applications.
Another  element  of  instability  is  caused  by  “flipping  practices”,  buying  homes  for  short  term  price 
speculation purposes.  The penalties  for  exiting home loans after  short  periods  should be high,  so as  to 
discourage individual households to turn homes into a speculation object. The beneficiaries of such penalties  
should not be the banks but Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac as they arrange the main part of the funding for  
home acquisitions and may be made responsible for maintaining orderly markets.
If the income and the balance sheet risks are separated between banks taking on the credit risks on their  
customers and Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac taking on the funding risks, individual households will have the  
best  of  both  worlds  in  terms  of  home  acquisitions:  liquidity,  affordability  and  stability.  When  income  
developments allow it, the customers may also save more by repaying part of their mortgage early. Banks 
will  be rewarded for conservative behaviour rather than for reckless lending and short term home value  
speculators will have to pay the price for discontinuing living in an own home.
4.4 Flaws in the Adjustment Process 
It has been five years since the crisis started and the adjustment process has been “achieved” only by the  
efforts of individuals in saving more for paying off home loans out of incomes and in saving more for  
pensions. During the first six months of this year and for the first time in the long adjustment period, the  
asset values of homes have gone up  by $730 billion, showing that the pressure of the forced sales is receding  
somewhat.  Home prices are up by 3% over the same period last year and the latest figures on new housing 
starts -on an annualised basis- were 872 000 in September 2012. Corporate equities are still lower in value 
now than in 2006. Unemployment rates are also still very much higher than in 2006 but slightly improving.  
The government deficit has increased substantially over the last five years. Economic growth has not reached 
its long term potential by a substantial margin. The threat is that the budget policies of reducing expenditure  
and increasing taxes may come too soon for the recovery to take hold.
What the balance sheet action by the banks has caused is that the income side of the U.S economy runs 
below its optimal level. In the above it has already been pointed out that the (re)action of the collective of  
individual households has been to save more and borrow less with a negative impact on GDP of -6.5% per 
annum since 2008. The U.S individual households are collectively still very wealthy in balance sheet terms 
as  evidenced by the  half  year  figure  of  2012 of  $62.3  trillion.  In  income  terms  there  has  been  above 
mentioned negative impact of  -6.5% Secondly the number of employed persons has dropped from 146.1 
million in November 2007 to 142.1 million in August this year (-3%); a lower number of employed persons 
also reduces the collective spending power by some similar figure. Both these negative growth factors show 
that the income side still requires a boost. It is clear that boosting economic growth by the U.S government  
through increasing its budget deficit any higher than it is already is no option. It does not own enough assets 
to convert such assets into cash and just increasing liabilities will reduce future government’s spending on  
vital services. This leaves the possibility of a conversion of private sector assets into cash as the only other  
option. The most logical choice is to use assets which are not linked to current liabilities from the individual  
households. This excludes homes and equities as liquidation of the latter would destroy the production side 
of an economy on which all incomes depend. Therefore pension reserves, as they represent an asset base 
which is clearly intended to be used in future years for income generation, can help out on a temporary basis. 
Such a method could be called the “economic easing” method.
How it could work in practice is set out below:
The Economic Easing Method
Individual households in the U.S., the U.K, the Netherlands and Canada have build up large pension fund 
reserves in order to pay for future incomes. These reserves have been accumulated via the contributions of 
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individuals and sometimes companies or even governments on their behalf. The savings have been invested 
nearly all in the financial markets in order to create investment returns. In a way pension funds, in their 
investment returns, closely resemble the country profit levels in a country. Pension funds usually have no 
gearing; they consist of pure savings allocated over the asset classes. Their accumulation and distribution 
pattern of savings is  closely monitored by the countries concerned.  Much debate is  going on about  the 
manner of measuring, predicting and allocating future investment results over the different age groups as 
longevity plays a major role in the changes. What, so far, has not been discussed is how pension funds could  
contribute to economic growth. The principal concept is to link accumulated savings directly with consumer 
spending in the current period. The current size of pension funds in the U.S., the U.K., the Netherlands and 
Canada make such a link possible. In all these countries the accumulated fund levels now exceed or closely 
resemble the annual GDP level.  An assets-to-incomes solution could be using the concept of ‘Economic 
Easing’ to stimulate economic  growth.  13.  This was elaborated upon in my paper:”When Capitalism No 
Longer Works -A Profit Warning”.
Economic easing can be defined as the action of turning a small  part of savings accumulated for future 
expenditure -the pension savings- into current consumption. It is using households’ balance sheets to turn 
assets temporarily into cash incomes and when economic growth has reached its desired level turn incomes  
back into assets. 
Take the U.S. case as an example. If 3% of pension savings were distributed in 2013, this would mean that 
$400  billion  extra  consumer  demand  would  be  created,  provided  all  beneficiaries  spend  their  pension 
dividend on consumer goods, something they should be encouraged to do. If, assuming again, that markets  
know that such action would be repeated in later years until economic growth reaches its optimal growth  
path, than such certainty will make companies wanting to invest their cash reserves or obtain additional bank 
or capital markets funding. Jobs will be created. Production levels will be increased. Company profits will  
increase, hence share prices will improve. Country profit levels will start to improve. Finally the government  
will  benefit  from higher tax incomes.  The positive multiplier effect will  start  to work as unemployment  
levels will also drop.
Of course the temporary cash injection into the U.S. economy out of  pension reserves can not  be done 
without a compensation for the pension funds. Such compensation will need a change in the tax laws. Until  
now the U.S. and other governments have always practised that taxes pay for government expenditure. To 
make economic easing a success requires a change in tax philosophy. Individual households provide all the  
funding for all business units, including a government, in the U.S. and in other countries. When an economy 
is  stimulated  in  above  described  manner  all  households  in  a  country  benefit.  It  would  therefore  be  
appropriate that when the benefits are shared, also the costs of it are shared. This implies that a small portion  
of future tax receipts is set aside for returning the savings back to the pension funds as and when economic  
growth has reached its optimal growth level. The boost for the economy in 2013 would not be provided by 
the government -a Keynesian cash injection- but directly from individual households’ savings- the balance  
sheet- to individual households’ spending -the income based aspect of economic easing-. Government debt  
does  not  increase,  but  a  small  share  of  future  incomes  need to  be returned into savings,  which only a 
government can do through its tax collection. The savings into cash and back into savings cycle constitute a 
taxpayers’  obligation as all  taxpayers  will  be the beneficiaries of the economic boost  in the first  place.  
Pension funds in the U.S invest about 50% of their funds in equities and the remainder in other assets. If, as a  
consequence of economic easing, share prices will rise with 2 or more percent over inflation per annum, than 
for half the taxpayers’ guarantee such share price movement will take care of the obligation. The other half  
will need to be repaid at some future date, for which pension funds may be compensated at a long term  
government bond rate at inflation plus 2% per annum.
13 http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/cgi/users/home?eprintid=41671&screen=EPrint::View::Owner
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The practical implications for implementing an economic easing policy are as follows:
- Step 1: The Government aims to reach an agreement with all pension funds (DB as well as DC schemes) so 
that the latter can pay say 3% of their value to all pension savers and retirees. The values could be fixed as of  
30th December 2012.
- Step 2: Once an in principle agreement has been reached, such pay out (a pension dividend) could be made  
available in four equal quarterly instalments of 0.75% of the value, starting as soon as administrative hurdles 
have been overcome.
- Step 3: The pay out could be for an equal amount per pension saver and retiree. This would benefit the  
younger and the less well off more than those closer to retirement date and those with the larger pension 
pots. However the younger participants have the longest period of contributions and investment risks ahead 
of them.
- Step 4: As the aim of this measure is to stimulate economic growth; the government might agree to have 
the pension dividend paid out tax free.
- Step 5: If pension funds are short of cash, they could be allowed to borrow these amounts from the Fed in 
the U.S., until pension contributions and dividend and interest flows have come in.
- Step 6: As a logical extension of economic easing, which is done to create more Country Profit for all 
households, a government could agree that the pension savings used for current consumption will be repaid  
by the taxpayers or partly by taxpayers (see point 8 below).
- Step 7: The logical conclusion could be that such repayments take place as and when economic growth 
rates have reached the desired level, in other words when Country Profit levels have reached their long term 
average.
- Step 8: The rewards for pension funds in participating in such a scheme could be a taxpayer’s guarantee,  
based on an inflation level plus 2% remuneration per annum for the pension funds. The indirect rewards for  
pension funds are more substantial as the increased level of demand in the company sector will be translated  
in higher share prices. Banks will experience less loan losses. The government will also benefit indirectly by 
higher tax incomes. The maturity of the economic easing facility should be determined by the pension funds 
and  the  government  jointly  based  on  actual  country  profit  developments.  As  US  pension  funds  have 
collectively allocated about 50% of their portfolios in shares, if these shares -as a consequence of economic  
easing- rise by inflation level plus 2% or over per annum, the amount to be repaid out of future taxes should  
be halved. 
- Step 9: As the repayment obligation is not linked with the repayment of past government expenditure, 
economic easing does not influence government debt levels. It is in effect a scheme to bring forward the use  
of a small part of the savings and have such savings replaced by all taxpayers as and when Country Profit  
levels start to rise.
- Step 10: Finally the beneficiaries of the pension dividend should be convinced that the amounts are for 
consumption purposes rather than for adding to the savings level.
The economic easing method can be started up and stopped very easily. It can also be maintained for longer 
than a year,  if  needed.  Both groups of taxpayers  and pension pot  savers and retirees are United States 
citizens. A potential positive side effect of economic easing is that it will stimulate individual households to 
participate in funded pension scheme savings as only pension savers and retirees will receive a “pension 
dividend”. Such participation will reduce the pressure on future government’s budgets to provide for the 
basic state pension.
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The country profit level between 1995 and 2006 used to be on average $3.2 trillion. An injection of $400 
billion in demand in 2013 will create a multiplier effect as additional jobs will be created and investments  
will go up to increase output levels. Company and bank risks will come down. It may take a year or two to 
get the whole economy back to the average country profit level of $3.2 trillion. However the higher level of 
economic growth will do wonders for the government’s budget even at unchanged tax rates.
The Fiscal Cliff
If the economic easing method had been applied in 2008 and 2009, the enormous impact from the balance  
sheet crisis on jobs, economic growth and on the government’s budget deficit would have been lessened 
dramatically. It was not, but it is still very useful to apply this method before major tax changes take place.
Perhaps an economic  easing programme  can be started soon.  The effects  of  such a programme  can be  
measured very quickly. Stock markets have a tendency to anticipate events. It might therefore be useful to  
fulfil  the  dream of  economic  growth  first  before  adjustments  are  made  to  the  tax  regime.  Anyway tax 
incomes will rise with higher economic growth rates. Spending cuts can always be implemented if it means  
that the U.S government can do the same with the use of less money. 
4.5 Long Term U.S Government Bond Yield
Historically, from 1912 until 2012, the U.S Government 10 year Bond yield averaged 6.5% reaching an all 
time high of 15.8% in September of 1981 and a record low of 1.4% in July of 2012. What it means is that 
currently savers funding the U.S government bond issues receive a below inflation level compensation for 
holding  U.S.  10  year  government  bonds.  The  balance  sheet  aspect  is  that  U.S  government  debt  levels  
increase less rapidly, but the income aspect is that in times of economic slow down the government takes  
away an income element from individual households which could have been used to stimulate spending,  
especially if the economic easing method is applied.  The Fed, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England 
have shown in using Quantitative Easing practices that central banks can print money to buy government 
debt and bring interest rates down, with the side effect of higher inflation. Quantitative easing does not 
change the level of government debt; only its temporary owner. What it does change is that the risks for  
individual households stay the same but the reward for these households is reduced.  In lean economic times 
it is more important to maintain incomes rather than reducing future cash flows. Issuing 10 year government  
bonds with a positive margin over inflation levels will do the trick, for instance at 2% over inflation levels  
for such bonds. An interesting fact is that the Bank of England’s own pension fund has invested nearly all of  
its reserves in such inflation based government bonds. It is one of the very few pension funds in the U.K., 
which have maintained a very high pension reserve ratio and not suffered from quantitative easing practices.  
In the U.S the average 10 year government bond yield of 6.5% over the last 100 years did not stop economic 
growth. A policy to maintain long term government bond rates over and above inflation levels will help the 
recovery rather than hinder it.
4.6 Some European Considerations
4.6.1 The European Government Bond Yield Programme
The 17 Eurozone countries share one currency, but each country has a different inflation rate, a different rate  
of economic growth, a different level of unemployment, a different level of outstanding government debt and 
a  different  state  of  its  banking sectors.  Taxation levels  differ  and so do the savings levels  for  pension  
provisions.  Managing  the  gap  risks  between  short  and  long  term  savings  intentions  needs  positive 
government actions, not necessarily at European Union level, but collectively at individual country level.
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This could be done as follows: Countries such as Austria, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,  
France and Finland could attract 10 year funds from the financial markets not for government spending but  
for financial risk management purposes by depositing these funds as reserves at the ECB. As both assets and  
liabilities rise simultaneously,  such action does not  increase a government’s  debt  level.  As an example, 
Germany could use these powers until its borrowing yield reaches 3.35%; 2% over its current bond yield 
level. These savings remain German savings at the ECB. For the other six funding countries their inflation 
rate plus 1.35% would also be the yard stick. The ECB could with these funds, subsequently buy up long 
term government debt of the 10 countries, provided that they follow the fiscal pact. In these 10 countries the  
yield has overshot the level of inflation plus 1.35%. In the case of Spain, which always had a very prudent 
central government, its inflation rate is, like Germany’s, 2%, but its current yield is 5.88%. In this example  
the ECB would buy 10 year Spanish bonds currently at 5.88% and subsequently at lower yields till  the 
Spanish yield also stands at 3.35%. 
The ECB’s interest income from Spanish bonds exceeds the borrowing costs of the seven countries. Such 
interest income will be fully distributed over the funders pro rata of their funding contributions. In this way  
the  costs  of  issuing  more  government  debt  than  needed for  own government  expenditure  of  the  seven 
countries is more than met by the income from bonds of the 10 countries held by the ECB. Governments of 
the seven countries could ensure that the Profit made out of the funding and loan transaction by the ECB is 
returned  to  individual  households.  Individual  households  will  see  that  the  cross  country  risk  taking  is 
rewarded with a pay out. At the same time fiscal prudence stays intact. The action is aimed at maintaining  
financial  stability  across  the  Eurozone,  rather  than  increasing  government  expenditure  levels  in  any 
participating Eurozone country. It is a balance sheet method, by expanding the balance sheet on both sides at  
the same time. It will have a positive income effect for the risk takers, but also a positive impact on the 
government budgets of the beneficiary countries, which helps all individual households in these countries.  
The interest costs will be met by the real borrowers, the 10 nations. The fund suppliers –the seven nations-  
get an extra income, while the taxpayers in the 10 countries benefit from the balancing act of the ECB. The 
ECB’s mandate may need to be adjusted for executing this type of financial transaction. The great advantage 
is that the ECB does not need to rely on money printing, but can rely on moving real private savings within  
the Eurozone countries. The other major advantage is that the risk guarantors -the individual households in 
the seven countries- get paid for such risk taking. The risks involved are minimal as the 10 countries can  
fund their government bond obligations, not on short term financial market speculation but on long term 
taxpayer’s obligations to solve their own government debt problems. By lowering the overall risk level in the 
Eurozone countries all countries -including all households- benefit. Of course, the criterion for assisting the  
10 countries is that they apply the fiscal pact requirements. Executing such a balancing act has to be done on 
a daily basis; only the ECB is up to this task. The European Financial Stability Fund cannot operate in the 
required manner. The financial markets will relish this type of market stabilisation by the ECB and private  
sector fund flows will soon return directly to the higher paying Eurozone countries, making intervention 
unnecessary.
4.6.2 The Spanish Housing Problem
Apart from economic growth, Spain needs a solution to its overhang of 800 000 unsold homes. By solving  
this problem the banking problem will be much less acute. A possible solution is described below.
In Spain, the cause of its current crisis has very little to do with the Euro as a currency or with the Spanish  
government acting imprudently, but all to do with some banks turning savings into 800 000 homes which 
could not be sold to potential buyers. What other European governments might have done to help manage  
these collective risks from spreading to the Spanish economy and Spanish government is set up a second 
home acquisition scheme for their own nationals rather than lend Euro100 billion to the Spanish government, 
or directly to the Spanish banks. The latter injection equates to Euro125 000 for each unsold home. The 
unsold home problem could have been solved much more effectively by supporting foreigners in buying 
homes in Spain from the Spanish banks or population. This could be done with the help of a subsidy. Instead 
of providing Euro125 000 per home, give foreigners a subsidy of 20% of the amount i.e. Euro25 000 per  
home. If the lending is also executed by German, British, French, Dutch, Swiss, Austrian and Scandinavian 
banks than the inward capital movement into Spain will help solve the real estate crisis, part of the banking  
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crisis and a substantial  part  of  the government  debt  crisis.  The homes should be of a minimal  value of  
Euro150 000, which equates to properties of 120 sq meters in the Spanish Mediterranean Coastal provinces. 
Such potential buyers should themselves put in an amount minimally equal to the governments’ injection.  
The remainder amount should be up to the foreign bank’s credit judgment. The buyers should also agree not 
to sell the properties for a minimum of five years.  The Bank of Spain could supervise the scheme. Of course  
the scheme would be stopped as and when the supply of homes comes nearer to the full utilisation levels.
The consequences: The Spanish property markets will turn around pretty quickly; a place in the sun is still a 
dream for many Northern Europeans. The Spanish banks will be relieved from their property overhang on  
which no cash flow is received while their borrowings still carry interest costs. The Spanish people who sell  
and move to other properties will usually have more cash available as 50% of homes are owned in Spain 
without a mortgage. European governments usually operate either capital gains taxes or income taxes on 
second properties, so they will get their money back in due course. Last but not least the capital inflows into  
Spain and the strengthening of the banking sector plus the additional tourist incomes will help the Spanish 
economy to turn around as well. This comes all at a fraction of the costs of the Euro100 billion. Spanish  
government  bond  yields  will  come  down  as  well.  The  example  is  just  one  of  the  ways  in  which 
understanding the causes of the risks to savers can help devise sound solutions. The “perceived risk” outlook  
for Spain will fundamentally change by implementing this scheme.
5 Conclusions
The analysis of what went wrong in economic terms in the U.S. since 2007 is best described by utilising the  
two instruments which help companies to show their results but are equally applicable to all households: The  
balance sheet and the profit and loss accounts. The Federal Reserve has been publishing the balance sheet  
data for individual households for a long time already. Out of these data the P/L accounts can be deduced. 
The first conclusion, which can be drawn from above study, is that it is necessary to study the time series  
rather than the data from a specific year alone. In our case the pre-2008 series were studied in order to see 
what the U.S. population was capable of in terms of producing increasing levels of wealth. In US dollar  
terms on average for the period 1995-2006 the net worth incremental value was $3.2 trillion, which can be 
called “Country Profit”-  and which consisted of  two factors:  the return over  the  savings from previous 
periods and the additional savings from the current periods. With a net worth level of $62.7 trillion as per 
end of June 2012, it is easy to conclude that the savings element out of current incomes can only represent a  
minor fraction of the accumulated savings level.
The second conclusion which can be drawn is  that  returns over the accumulated savings -the “interest” 
returns- are available, but have to be deduced from the changes in asset values. For instance in the case of  
house prices, the average home price and the change therein reflects the reward for the savings embedded in 
the homes. For equity provided to companies, both for listed as for noncorporate businesses, the reward over  
the assets invested is  not  the  income transferred in the  current  year,  either to shareholders or company 
owners, to employees or to the government -irrespective of how important such elements are to economic  
growth- but the annual changes in the individual household balance sheet for savings values invested in 
equities. For government bonds it is the government debt level and its annual increase which represents the 
change  in  the  financial  position  of  individual  households.  The  current  set  up  of  the  balance  sheet  of  
households and nonprofit organizations does reflect the asset values of U.S government bonds well, but fails  
to include the liability side. The funding for U.S government debt is ultimately provided or guaranteed by all  
American individual households. This is an asset item for individual households. One also knows that out of  
future income such debt has to be repaid and serviced. This liability out of future income has not been  
included in the current set up of the individual household balance sheet as the latter relates to future cash  
flows.  The  Citizens’  Guide  to  the  2011  Financial  Report  of  the  U.S  Government  does  work  out  the 
implications for deficit funding over the next 75 years. The future taxpayers’ obligations do need to include  
interest payments due and it is likely that the average interest rate applied will be closer to the average U.S 
government bond yield over the last 100 years, which was 6.5%, rather than the current yield of 1.62%
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The third conclusion which can be drawn is that the current crisis was caused by the lending policies applied  
to the home mortgage markets; by the securitisation of the home mortgage risks; by the distribution of these 
risks around the world and by the subsequent debtor workout schemes by changing from an income based 
recovery of  outstanding loans to  asset  based liquidations.  The banking crisis  followed;  followed by the  
equity markets crisis and the government budget crisis. In this whole process many jobs were lost, and still  
as of to-date 12.3 million Americans are out of work. Also Country Profits were lost to an extent of $17.8  
trillion over  the  period January 2008 till  June 2012.  The latter  was calculated as  if  trends would have 
continued uninterruptedly.
The fourth conclusion is  that  the  causes  of  this  economic  crisis  were found in the  economic  set-up of 
American society -the econsystem-. If this was the case, than possible solutions need to be found in changing 
the flaws in the system. Flaws in the banking system, in the mortgage lending system, in the speed of the  
adjustment  process and in the government  long term bond yield assessment  were discussed.  Finally the 
timing issue of changing government budget measures was raised.
For  the  banking  system it  was  recommended  to  consider  setting  up  economic  balance  sheets  and  P/L 
accounts. It was argued that banks need proper provisioning for risks taken from the very moment that these  
risks enter the books of the bank -hence the need for an economic balance sheet, a balance sheet which  
reflects risks and rewards-. It was also argued that if proper provisioning takes place, banks do not need 
shareholder equity as the role of the banks is only in risk intermediation between funds attracted and funds 
lend out as well as providing payment, foreign exchange and securities services. The suggestion was made 
-in order to reflect bank risks properly- that shareholders’ risks are split into an income related and a balance  
sheet related risk. The income risks can be fixed at a fixed price say 5% over a principal value to be set, or as  
a price related to inflation, say 3% over inflation. For this price shareholders accept that the banks can write  
down or up the value of the asset in their balance sheet. Such income method shows the bank’s managerial  
skills rather than the shareholders having both income and balance sheet risks.  This solution does not require 
that the size of the equity buffer is measured in relation to the size of a bank’s assets. If the proposed capital  
adequacy ratios were to be implemented, economic growth prospects will be harmed as the process depends  
on the willingness of investors to put additional financial resources into bank equity levels, a very unlikely 
prospect.
For the mortgage lending system it  was recommended to concentrate the balance sheet  aspect  of  home  
funding with Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac as they -based on the government’s positive equity guarantee for 
these institutions- can fund themselves the cheapest and for the longest periods at fixed interest rates. It was 
also recommended to leave the home mortgage credit risks -the income risks- with the banks or other home  
mortgage providers. The conclusion was also drawn that mortgage products should rely much more on the 
income side and on the individual’ savings side than on the value development of the home. 
For speeding up the economic recovery it was suggested to use the “economic easing” scheme converting on 
a temporary basis individual households’ balance sheet items from accumulated pension reserves to cash and 
when economic growth has reached the desired level return the cash back to savings.
Quantitative easing has both a balance sheet effect and an income effect. The balance sheet effect is that  
government  debt  moves  from the  individual  households  to  the  Federal  Reserve,  however  the  risks  for  
repaying U.S government debt stay with the individual households. The income effect is that the yield over  
long term bonds were brought down and that the acquired portfolio of government bonds by the Fed no  
longer yields any income any longer for the individual households -two income lowering effects at a time  
that the general income level is already under severe pressure.
For the U.S the final conclusion is that perhaps it is better to implement the assets into cash strategy first -the  
economic growth boost- before altering the tax rates. Lowering government expenditure levels, if the desired 
services can be delivered at lower costs, is always a good thing.
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For Europe the current strategy to turn countries around seems strongly based on government budgets and 
government borrowings rather than on home prices, equity prices, pension reserves and last but not least on 
unemployment levels. If adjustment strategies only mean that the holders of government debt are swapped 
from the private sector to the IMF, the ECB and other country government sources without due regard for 
Country Profits of the countries concerned than the period of adjustments will take for a very long time  
accompanied by tremendous economic waste. Economic growth is needed for these countries. For Spain a  
solution to its excessive supply of homes is also needed. Economic easing methodology is needed, even if  
the funds have to be resourced from other European countries. After all such a methodology is a self help  
scheme as the effect will be that international trade levels will pick up again.
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